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Abstract:  
Social media companies rely on user agreements as one means to manage content produced 
by users. While much has been written on user agreements and community standards of US-
based social media, surprisingly little is known about Chinese user agreements and their 
implications. We compare terms of services as well as privacy policies of WeChat and Weibo 
between 2014 and 2019 using their US-counterparts WhatsApp and Twitter as a benchmark. 
We find that Chinese user agreements reveal a territorial-based understanding of content 
management differentiating between PRC and Non-PRC users based on language, IP address 
and country of citizenship. Second, Chinese social media companies are surprisingly 
transparent about what content can be published, which has implications for self-censorship 
among users. Third, changes in PRC User agreements reflect Xi Jinping’s tightening control of 
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the Internet. Finally, US-based platforms have moved towards content management that 
differs by region, thus becoming more similar to the Chinese approach over time. 
 
Keywords: Social media, content management, censorship, user agreements, privacy, China, 
Twitter, WhatsApp, WeChat, Weibo. 
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Introduction 
Social media companies across the world are taking on an important role in managing and 
controlling Internet content. They are using a variety of means to do so, such as automatic upload 
filtering, user reporting, and user agreements. Social media platforms have become “proxy 
censors” regulating content with regards to government and own commercial interests (Hintz, 
2016, p. 340).  
While a large literature exists on terms of use, community standards, privacy policies, and 
information regarding data processing of US-based companies (Celeste, 2019; Hintz and Milan, 
2011; Leistert, 2015; Lovink, 2013; Silverman, 2015; Youmans and York, 2012), little is known 
about Chinese user agreements aimed at regulating and managing content. This is surprising 
given China’s 772 million Internet users, making up the largest group of Internet users in the world 
(China Internet Network Information Center, 2018). In addition, Chinese companies have started 
to serve as examples for important companies outside of China. For example, Facebook has been 
observing WeChat’s integration into Tencent’s e-finance system very closely (Jacobs, 2019).  
Chinese social media companies operate in a drastically different environment than US-
based companies. Social media platforms are first defined as media in China and only second as 
products of private companies. As a result, they are integrated into China’s political structure 
whereby companies are subject to an elaborate state administrative structure led by the 
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Cyberspace Administration of China in charge of regulating online content [1]. Within this 
institutional infrastructure the implementation of content management is outsourced to private 
companies, whereby Chinese companies rely on similar mechanisms as their counterparts outside 
of China to manage content (see, for example, Cairns, 2016). Here, we focus on user agreements 
as one such important mechanism: How do Chinese social media companies communicate 
restrictions to users? What do Chinese user agreements have in common and how does this 
approach differ from their US counterparts? 
We compare Weibo and WeChat user agreements composed of terms of services and 
privacy policies between 2014 and 2019. Due to similarities of the platforms user agreements of 
Twitter and WhatsApp are used as a benchmark for reference. We are not systematically 
comparing Chinese and U.S.-based user agreements in order to draw conclusions about 
differences between these two countries. We highlight four key findings: First, Chinese user 
agreements reveal a territorial-based understanding of content management. Social media 
companies differentiate between users based on their language, IP address and country of 
citizenship. So-called PRC Users, defined as people holding a Chinese passport, people entering 
the territory of the PRC, or Chinese-incorporated companies, have to abide by PRC-specific user 
agreements, whereas Non-PRC Users have very similar rights to users from US-based companies. 
Second, Chinese social media companies are surprisingly transparent regarding censorship, 
personal information and data processing to enforce self-censorship among its netizens. Third, 
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changes in PRC User agreements reflect Xi Jinping’s tightening control of the Internet. During the 
first five years of his rule the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has centralized China’s state 
administrative bodies in charge of regulating online content (Cairns, 2016; Creemers, 2017). 
Changes in user agreements reflect this broader trend. Finally, while we do not find evidence for 
a territorial-based approach among US-based companies in 2014, Twitter and Facebook have 
moved towards content management that differs by region in 2019, thus becoming more similar 
to the Chinese approach over time. 
To provide background we start laying out China’s approach towards legal reform and 
content management of social media companies, followed by an explanation of the above main 
findings. We conclude with a discussion, placing findings from China within broader trends in 
content management. 
 
China’s Legal System and the Approach Towards Content Management 
In contrast to liberal democracies characterized by ‘rule of law’, the Chinese state operates within 
‘rule by law’, whereby the Chinese Communist Party assumes a privileged position above the law 
and the government (Wang and Liu, 2019). For example, during the recent anti-corruption 
campaign President Xi Jinping ordered corruption investigations against party members sidelining 
the general bureaucratic body (Heilmann, 2016; Visualizing China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, 
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2018). This explains the top-down nature of the party giving directives to the Chinese judicial 
system and the government.  
However, China has also undergone legal reform which weakens the top-down nature of 
rule by law. As part of legal reform the government directs decision-making by mostly local 
officials to courts, not allowing party officials to intervene in judicial processes (Liebman, 2017). 
Wang and Liang (2019) demonstrate that government officials also empower courts to effectively 
respond to environmental protection in Guiyang. The Chinese political system is therefore not 
characterized by a fully centralized hierarchical structure; instead, China experts have long 
emphasized the fragmented nature of the Chinese authoritarian state promoting legal reforms 
for more effective governance (see, for example, Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). In the words of 
Cheesman (2014, p. 113): the Chinese ruling elites are not on the “low rungs on a ladder to the 
rule of law; they are climbing a different ladder altogether.” 
More specifically regarding content management, China has built an extensive 
infrastructure for media governance within which social media companies are integrated. Chinese 
media remain embedded into a sophisticated institutional framework that monitors media 
content and gives directives to media when content is undermining official policies and goals of 
the government. Yet along with the introduction of market forces in media and the development 
of new communication technologies, such as the Internet and cell phones, the CCP has moved 
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away from using overt techniques of giving directives to media professionals to increasingly 
relying on softer and more subtle techniques (Stockmann, 2013). 
In terms of media governance the state has been strengthening the legal system and has 
been fostering self-regulation among journalists. Chinese media are often solving disputes with 
officials in the courtroom where they lose most defamation cases brought against them (Liebman, 
2011). The Chinese state has also promoted training and education of journalists in exercising 
“societal responsibility” (社会责任) (Dombernowsky, 2016, p. 184) - a synonym for behaving in 
line with the goals and policies of the CCP, which is part of the ethical code. At the same time, 
critical investigative journalism has faced challenges, even more after Xi Jinping came into office 
(Tong, 2019). 
On social media, paid bloggers known as “50-cent party members” in combination with 
subtle technology, such as technical error messages that are displayed when information is 
deleted or blocked, create difficulties to detect censorship in the eyes of users (Bandurski, 2008; 
Boas, 2006; Brady, 2008; Chase et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2009; Qiu, 2000) [2]. To incentivize 
Internet companies to conform to censorship policies, companies have been awarded self-
discipline awards for displaying social responsibility [3]. At the same time, legal regulations passed 
towards the end of Hu Jintao’s and beginning of Xi Jinping’s rule form the basis to punish 
individual users for messages that go viral and potentially challenge social stability and deter users 
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from publishing and spreading such messages. Anyone deliberately posting lies may face up to 
three years in prison, if their posts are shared more than 500 times or viewed by more than 5,000 
people [4]. After years of resistance among Chinese netizens, real name registration, under which 
every user is required to register with the real name for the general use of Internet services, was 
implemented in 2015 (Li, 2015) [5]. User agreements are part of this effort to become more 
transparent about rules for deletion and blocking of content; by speaking directly to users they 
aim to educate users about rules for self-censorship associated with socially responsible behavior. 
In China transparency is used to improve implementation of policies with the broader goal of 
supporting the survival of the party (Stromseth et al, 2017). With greater openness of information 
regarding what is socially desirable, the central government tries to encourage citizens and media 
to monitor the Internet for misconduct, while at the same time strengthening the position of the 
CCP (Stromseth et al, 2017). 
Overall Xi’s administration has tightened the control over the Internet by introducing a 
complementary system of legal and regulatory measures that influence behavior among Internet 
users directly as opposed to working solely via Internet companies (Creemers, 2017). It is 
important to keep this context in mind when interpreting content of Chinese user agreements 




We collected user agreements composed of terms of service and privacy policies from the official 
website of Weibo owned by Sina and WeChat owned by Tencent. As a baseline for comparison 
we also collected those by their respective US counterparts Twitter and WhatsApp. We also 
checked which user agreement was available to users depending on whether the App was used 
in English or Chinese (simplified and traditional). As shown in Table 1, Chinese user agreements 
divide into Non-PRC User and PRC User versions. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
 
We compared these user agreements in terms of structure, regulations on user-uploaded 
contents, and differentiation of PRC Users and Non-PRC Users in 2014 and 2019. We proceeded 
in three steps: first, we compared the Chinese versions to the English version from the same 
company to see how WeChat and Weibo treat PRC and Non-PRC Users; second, we used user 
agreements of U.S.-based platforms as a benchmark, to highlight the specific characteristics of 
Chinese user agreements. Third, we compared 2014 and 2019 versions of Weibo and WeChat to 
identify changes over time. 
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Toward a Territorial-based Approach of Content Management 
The two Chinese companies, Sina and Tencent, distinguish between PRC and Non-PRC Users in 
their user agreements, whereby users receive different versions depending on their language 
preferences. For example, WeChat defined PRC Users in the following way:   
“These Terms apply to you if you are a user of our services anywhere in the world other 
than the People’s Republic of China (and you are not a citizen of the People’s Republic of 
China). If you are: (i) a user of our services in the People’s Republic of China; (ii) a citizen 
of the People’s Republic of China using our services anywhere in the world; or (iii) a 
Chinese-incorporated company using our services anywhere in the world, please refer to 
the Terms of Service (PRC Users) for the terms that apply to you in your use of our 
services.” 
When selecting simplified Chinese (简体中文) on the international homepage, users will be 
redirected to the PRC homepage of WeChat. This website only provides the PRC version (English 
and Chinese) of the user agreement. The version for Non-PRC Users is not mentioned. Hence, 
language defines a digital boundary between the PRC and the international versions of user 
agreements. As mentioned above, another filter is the IP address. If users have an IP address from 
China, they will be automatically directed to the PRC version without having an option to choose 
the international version in the first place. Weibo uses the same mechanisms – language 
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preferences and IP address - to differentiate PRC and Non-PRC Users, but it does not provide a 
definition of PRC Users.  
While the 2014 Non-PRC version of WeChat applies additional laws to users from the US 
and Australia, the 2019 Non-PRC version also includes the EU. Interestingly, Weibo does not make 
this differentiation at all. All user agreements of Weibo in 2014 and 2019 are based on the law of 
the PRC.  
In comparison, the two US-based social media companies do not treat users differently 
depending on location, language, or IP address; one version is available in English for all users (see 
Table 1). Nevertheless, US-based social media differentiate between users according to regions 
they are based in. WhatsApp refers to different headquarters being responsible for European and 
non-European users in 2019. This regional separation does not appear in 2014. Twitter also 
differentiates between users in 2019. They provide one version of terms of service that only 
applies to US-American netizens and one for all international users. This points towards greater 
territorial-based approach towards content management over time, even among US-based 
companies. Different to the Chinese social media user agreements, US based social media does 
not define digital boundaries between its users. All users can access the different versions of the 
user agreements.  
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Toward Greater Transparency 
China’s division into PRC and Non-PRC user agreements is significant, because the PRC version 
aims to make content management transparent to users. The PRC user agreements of Weibo and 
WeChat contain a section on user behavior and conditions for using the applications. WeChat 
explicitly states that users have to take responsibility for all actions on their accounts, whereas 
Weibo makes users responsible for content they post. Twitter and WhatsApp also mention that 
users are responsible for posted content, but provide less restrictions for political content. 
Before we engage with rules for content management we first take a closer look at how 
social responsibility is defined as this concept lays out expectations for acceptable user behavior. 
Weibo and WeChat provide descriptions of their general expectation of user behavior. Weibo is 
explicit about what the social responsibility of a user should entail:  
“Users should be civilized, respect personal rights and privacy of other users and they 
should build together a harmonious, civilized and polite social network environment.” 
WeChat, however, provides a vague description, appealing to contributing to an overall respectful 
environment. Although this general description leaves room for interpretation, these rules are 
meant to educate users about which content can be published based on appeals towards healthy 
and civil discourse.  
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Similar to US-based user agreements, Chinese terms of services are embedded into a legal 
framework, but in this case the laws and regulations of the PRC. According to terms of services 
users are not allowed to cover content [8]:  
(1) against the basic principles of the constitution;  
(2) endangering state security, disclosing state secrets to subvert state power or disrupt 
national unity;  
(3) damaging national reputation and interest;  
(4) stirring up ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination and undermining national unity; 
(5) undermining the country’s religious policies to promote cults and feudal superstitious; 
(6) spreading rumors, disturbing social order, undermining social stability; 
(7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terror or instigation 
crime; 
(8) insulting or slandering others, infringing upon the lawful rights and interests of others; 
(9) infringing on intellectual property rights of any third party, copyright, reputation and 
trade secrets 
(10) violating human morality, customs and habits. 
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(11) any form of advertising without permission from the Internet platform provider is not 
allowed. 
These rules are not contained in Non-PRC User versions. Rules 1-6 in particular specify the 
correct political usage of the social media platform. By making clear that social media should not 
be used to undermine the constitution, state security, national reputation or national unity, IT 
companies remind users that social media, just like traditional media, should only be used in ways 
that uphold the CCP’s leadership and the party’s organizational principles and policies [9]. All 
changes to the constitution made under Xi Jinping’s rule in 2018 also apply to user agreements 
[10]. Similarly, users should not undermine China’s unity, making an implicit reference to ethnic 
conflict and segregation movements in Xinjiang and Tibet as well as religious movements, such as 
Falun Gong, that could potentially threaten CCP rule and national unity [11]. Overall, users have 
to follow the official line that demands support of unity and leadership under the rule of the CCP 
led by Xi Jinping. 
False information has been an important aspect of content management in China since the 
introduction of advertising as an alternative funding of media outlets (Stockmann, 2013). Under 
Xi Jinping new legal regulations were passed that shed light on the definition of false information 
and rumors [12]. In line with these legal regulations, references to rumors in user agreements, as 
in rule 6 above, refer to information that has the potential to cause instability, which is, of course, 
subject to decision by respective administrative authorities, and information that has not been 
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confirmed by official sources (DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007; Wu, 2018; Zeng et al., 2017) [13]. For 
example, in 2017 the Cyberspace Administration of China issued a provision stating that netizens 
are allowed to repost information published by government organizations without altering the 
content (Cyber Space Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室), 2017). In other words, 
information that has been cleared by government organizations clearly do not fall into the 
category of false information or rumors.   
A core difference between WeChat and Weibo lies in how specific rules for deletion and 
blocking of content are spelled out to the user. WeChat explicitly mentions that demonstrations, 
illegal assembly etc. are prohibited, while Weibo uses broader terms, appealing to users to 
contribute to a “harmonious social network environment” or to avoid damaging “the image of 
the government or state organs”. In other words, WeChat is more precise on prohibited content 
compared to Weibo. 
 Surprisingly for an autocratic state, Chinese companies are remarkably transparent about 
content management in their Chinese user agreements. While US-based companies focus on 
prohibited information mentioned in rules 7-11 above, Chinese companies delete or block more 
information and regulate content that might have negative political ramifications. With regard to 
false information, although both Chinese and US-based companies do not provide clear 
definitions of what constitutes false information in user agreements, they adopt different 
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strategies towards inhibiting the spread of false information. National governments in the United 
States and Europe outsource the responsibility of managing false information to social media 
companies and place pressure on social media companies to delete posts or punish users in the 
event of spreading false information (Goldzweig et al., 2018) [14]. While China has followed a 
similar approach under Hu Jintao, under Xi Jinping the Chinese government has passed a series 
of legal regulations that hold individuals accountable. In practice, Chinese users are less 
concerned about political censorship and reactions by the regime compared to reactions by 
acquaintances, friends, and family. What kind of political talk is perceived to be socially desirable 
is more important in explaining whether people post or comment on political content online 
compared to fear of political repercussion or censorship (Stockmann and Luo, 2019). Legal 
regulations operate at this intersection between political and social norms; they provide 
guidelines for how to differentiate false from accurate information, thus supporting self-
censorship among what is envisioned as “socially responsible” user. 
 
Personal Information and Data Processing  
In line with the above-mentioned Chinese regulations, both Chinese companies ask users to 
register with real personal information. If users do not register with their real identity both 
services have the right to block or, in the case of Weibo, to even delete the account. Similarly, 
WhatsApp asks users to register with their real identity and update their information frequently. 
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Only Twitter does not require the user to register with a real name [15]. Hence, WhatsApp, 
WeChat (PRC version) and Weibo (PRC version) require more personal information on registration 
compared to Twitter. 
Processing data and sharing data with third parties are common practices among both 
Chinese and US-based social media. Weibo states in its 2019 version, that it has the right to review 
data and analyze user behavior or even pass it on to third parties. WeChat even states in its 
Privacy Policy of 2019 that Tencent will access and analyze user data without users’ consent under 
certain conditions, such as national interests, major public interests, or criminal investigations 
[16]. WhatsApp and Twitter reserve the right to investigate suspicious “activity” of users in order 
to secure the services provided. Therefore, US-based and Chinese social media companies are 
similar in that they leave room for surveillance and sharing of data with third parties, including 
commercial and government actors. Obviously, these companies operate within different legal 
environments, which provide users of US-based social media with greater legal protection 
compared to users of Chinese social media. 
 
Trend over Time 
As explained earlier, we detected more references to relevant laws and regulations that have 
been passed under Xi Jinping. Changes in PRC user agreements over time reflect greater 
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tightening of content management during the first five years of Xi Jinping’s rule. At the same time, 
however, greater embeddedness of user agreements into legal rules and regulations was also 
associated with greater transparency, thus increasing predictability of content management 
among users. Yet greater transparency is not only restricted to spelling out the rules of the game 
for users. For example, Weibo’s user agreement specifies how accounts of media and government 
are managed and regulated by the Cyberspace Administration Authority (网信部门) as well as 
the News and Information Authority (新闻主管部门) [17]. Sina also describes ties to China’s 
political structure.  
Regarding data privacy and processing data, we also detect more transparency over time. 
In 2014 Weibo claimed copyright over all content being published; in 2019 Weibo stated that Sina 
monitors and analyzes content and user behavior; Sina also specifies conditions under which 
users will be asked to report content or other users to the company or to government authorities. 
While WeChat did not provide any privacy policy in 2014, the privacy policy of 2019 requests real 
name and phone number as part of real identity registration. Furthermore, Tencent explicitly 
states to monitor or process user data if related to national interests, security, defense etc. Such 
references are missing in WeChat’s 2014 terms of service. 
A final change over time in user agreements refers to availability in English. Weibo does not 
provide an English version of terms of use anymore in 2019. However, WeChat provides the PRC 
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User version not only in Chinese but also in English [18]. This could be related to differences in 
the user base of the two companies, whereby Weibo’s user base has declined over time and is 
mainly based inside the Chinese Firewall (Benney and Xu, 2018), while WeChat has a significant 
presence in Australia (Walsh and Xiao, 2019). Another possible explanation for WeChat’s 
availability of its PRC user agreement in English is related to global operation of Chinese 
companies abroad since PRC Users also include employees of Chinese-incorporated firms outside 
of China. WeChat’s user agreement does not specify the criteria of being a Chinese incorporated 
company as part of its definition of PRC Users. The Chinese version remains vague about its 
definition of “Chinese-incorporated,” referring to “Chinese companies” (中国公司) operating 
outside of China, which could apply to companies registered in China or to companies receiving 
investment from Chinese companies or government regardless of their place of registration. As 
such, this definition could potentially have implications for employees of Chinese companies, for 
example, under the Belt and Road Initiative.  
 
Conclusion and Implications of Findings 
All our findings originate from two Chinese and two US-based companies at two points in time. 
Obviously, we cannot draw conclusions about trends in content management of Chinese and US 
companies more broadly. With that caveat in mind our findings suggest the following:  
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First, Chinese user agreements reveal a territorial-based approach towards content 
management. Weibo and WeChat differentiate between PRC and Non-PRC Users. Surprisingly, 
the boundaries of the nation state are not the only determining factor for being considered a PRC 
User – Chinese citizenship alone or working for a Chinese-incorporated company are sufficient 
indicators to qualify as PRC User on WeChat. Similarly, traveling to China is also sufficient to be 
qualified as a PRC User. 
Second, Chinese social media companies have become more transparent in terms of 
deleted content, use of personal information and data processing. Greater openness and 
transparency are in line with broader trends in the Chinese political system and support attempts 
to educate citizens to become more socially responsible (Stromseth et al., 2017; Yang, 2017). The 
Chinese government initiated a discourse on civil behavior to undermine criticism and its negative 
framing of the state (Yang, 2017). Spelling out the rules for rewarding and punishing correct 
behavior of users creates many ‘authorities’ (users) that help monitor content and behavior of 
other users (Stromseth et al., 2017, p. 43).  
Third, references to relevant laws reflect a broader trend towards stronger content 
management under Xi Jinping. Since some of the laws leave room for interpretation – the 
definition of rumors or fake news for example – content managers are in the position to re-define 
them depending on directions given by relevant state authorities. New rules of prohibiting the 
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spread of rumors or false information have been used to manage criticism and to silence users 
with large mobilization potential (Economy, 2018). In a leaked speech at the National Propaganda 
and Work Conference in 2013, Xi Jinping mentioned that public opinion leaders following the 
party line should be encouraged and those going against the official line should be restrained 
(Economy, 2018). As relevant laws and regulations have tightened space for public discourse 
under Xi Jinping, changes in PRC User agreements over time reflect greater tightening of content 
management during the first five years of Xi Jinping’s rule.   
While US-based companies tend to raise less restrictions for users, especially in the political 
realm compared to Chinese companies, at least WhatsApp has started to also raise false 
information in its user agreement. WhatsApp explicitly prohibits information that involves 
“publishing falsehoods, misrepresentations, or misleading statements” (WhatsApp Privacy Policy, 
2018). This likely reflects greater sensitivity towards false information in the United States after 
the 2016 Presidential elections. In light of an emerging discourse on harmful content on social 
media, many national governments are taking initiative to draft, pass, and implement laws that 
provide the legal basis for social media companies to delete and block content deemed to 
destabilize societies in the eyes of policy makers. Germany’s network enforcement act, 
implemented in 2018, is at the forefront of these developments (Goldzweig et al., 2018). National 
governments increasingly turn to more national-level laws and policies regarding content 
moderation, moving from self-regulation towards co-regulation of social media companies 
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(Goldzweig et al., 2018). While Twitter and WhatsApp only referred to US law in 2014, in 2019 
they also state Canadian (WhatsApp) and EU law. As user agreements of US-based companies 
state more national-level regulations for content management, they become more similar to 
Chinese user-agreements, which reflect a territorial-based vision of Internet Governance. Despite 
the differences in legal and government systems between both countries, future research may 
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Notes  
1. Authority between the Cyberspace Administration of China and the implementing 
ministries under the State Council remains unclear and tensions exist (Creemers, 2017). 
2. Both of these means are not easily detected by netizens – Internet commentators do not 
uncover that they are employed by the state and error messages when searching for 
sensitive keywords often indicate technical difficulties rather than detecting censorship as 
the cause. On trends towards more subtle means of censorship see, for example: 
Bandurski, 2008; Boas, 2006; Brady, 2008; Chase et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2009; Qiu, 2000. 
3. During the 15Th China Internet Conference the “China Internet Industry Self-discipline 
Award” was granted to about 30 enterprises (The 15th CIC successfully closed in Beijing, 
2016). 
4. China’s Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a new 
judicial interpretation in 2013 on fines or prison time for those profiting from spreading 
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rumors (Chinese Defamation Law (两高发布关于办理网络诽谤等刑事案件适用法律若
干问题的解释), 2013). 
5. The regulation was implemented by the Cyberspace Administration of China on 1 March 
2015. It follows the decision of the Standing Committee on December 2012 to improve 
the network security (National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision 
concerning Strengthening Network Information Protection, 2012). 
6. Facebook’s terms of service and privacy policy is available in various languages including 
Chinese, but not with any specific policies towards PRC Users. 
7. WhatsApp’s terms of service and privacy policy is available in Chinese and other 
languages, and the content of the Chinese version is the same as the English one. It does 
not contain any rules regarding deletion or blocking of political content as in WeChat’s 
and Weibo’s user agreements. 
8. Rules 1-8 are translated from the Chinese version of WeChat terms of service. The content 
is the same for Weibo. 
9. See also (Zhao, 1998). 
10. These changes include the infinite president term for Xi and his ideology, namely “Xi 
Jinping Thought” or “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in the preamble of the 
constitution (Dorn, 2018). 
11. Tibet has been part of the PRC since 1950. Tibet’s former religious leader, the Dalai Lama, 
lives in exile. In 2011 he officially declared the elected government of Tibet as legitimate 
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(Batke, 2019). However, Tibetans still see him as a spiritual leader, which has led to much 
resistance against Chinese authority, both inside and outside of China.  
 Xinjiang has been part of the PRC since 1949 (Davis, 2008). Tensions and acts of 
resistance have been increasing over time, especially since the late 1990s (Rudolf et al., 
2016). Most Uyghurs in China want to be able to openly live their shared Islamic culture 
and traditions, while a minority participates in separatist movements. The Uyghur 
diaspora strives to create awareness among Western publics to increase pressure on the 
Chinese government (Mukherjee, 2010).  
 Falun Gong was a self-organized movement in China with an administrative body 
and mobilization potential (Tong, 2002). It was officially banned in 1999.  
12. In 2013 China’s Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a 
new judicial interpretation on fines or prison time for those profiting from spreading 
rumors (Chinese Defamation Law (两高发布关于办理网络诽谤等刑事案件适用法律若
干问题的解释 ), 2013). In 2016 a new Cyber Security Law prohibited rumors that 
undermine economic and social order (Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (中华人民共和国网络安全法), 2016). 
13. In China, any information that does not align with the official party line can potentially be 
considered as rumor (Repnikova, 2018). 
14. WhatsApp explicitly prohibits information that involves “publishing falsehoods, 
misrepresentations, or misleading statements” (WhatsApp Privacy Policy, 2018). 
15. Facebook requires its users to register with their real name. 
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16. As of November 1, 2019, a “sovereign Russian internet” law came into effect with similar 
regulations, but the extent to which it has been implemented remains unclear. For 
example, Telegram has refused to provide the Russian government with data from its 
users. Russia follows China’s territorial-based approach towards internet governance and 
is in the process of building a firewall (Polyakova and Meserole, 2019). 
17. In addition to private accounts, WeChat may not refer to its relationship with the 
government, because the platform distinguishes between personal (private users) and 
public accounts (media, government, and other organizations). The use of WeChat’s 
official account is specified by a separate user agreement (WeChat Official Account Admin 
Platform User Agreement), which is beyond the scope of this study. 
18. Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter provide their user agreements in many different 
languages. However, Twitter does not provide a Chinese version. 
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 * Privacy policy is contained in the terms of service. 
** Terms of service and privacy policy in traditional Chinese are for Chinese 
users outside mainland China. 
*** As of August 15, 2019 only the Chinese PRC version exists on the official 
registration page. Within the App the international version is available when 
switching the device to English. 
 
